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A B S T R A C T
Performance-based remuneration, often in the form of share options, 
has been endorsed by researchers throughout the world as a way to 
align the interests of stakeholders and executive management. The 
wave of corporate scandals raised concerns regarding the design 
of executive remuneration and the extent to which share options 
truly align the interests of executive management and stakeholders. 
This article investigates the impact of share options on managerial 
behaviour. The article proposes changes at an internal governance 
level with respect to the remuneration of directors so as to align the 
interests of the remaining stakeholders. The article also discusses 
the disclosure of directors’ remuneration. The article concludes by 
presenting a summarised best practice framework. 
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Introduction and background
With the advent of the industrial revolution, businesses grew from entities owned and 
managed by the same person into large corporations where owners (shareholders) 
and management (executive directors) are separate role-players. Performance-based 
remuneration, often in the form of share options, was endorsed by researchers 
throughout the world as a way of aligning the interests of the shareholders and the 
agents (mostly executive directors) who act on behalf of the shareholders (Chan 
2008). 




Company failures in the UK in the 1980s led to a decline in investor 
confi dence and called for corporate governance reform, which in turn led to the 
establishment of the Cadbury Committee that investigated corporate governance 
concerns, including the accountability of the board of directors to shareholders 
and the society. During the 1990s, the issue of directors’ remuneration became 
a primary concern for investors and the public at large. Remuneration levels 
were increasing, while remuneration packages failed to provide the necessary 
incentives to directors to perform better. The Greenbury Committee (established 
in the UK) issued the Greenbury Report, incorporating a code of best practice 
on directors’ remuneration (Manifest 2004). In South Africa, the King Committee 
on Corporate Governance was established in 1993 to promote good corporate 
governance. Among other things, both King Reports (King I in 1994 and King II in 
2002) as well as the draft King III Report dealt with executive remuneration (PMG 
2002).
Executive remuneration remains a controversial topic, especially in South Africa 
where the wealth gap between rich and poor is still on the increase (Wray 2008). 
Newspaper headlines such as: “Workers angry at CEO salaries” (Business News 
2007), “Compensation grew with share option awards” (Hilzenrath & Willis 2006) 
and “Base se loontjek miljoene, kry 53 soveel as werker” (Bosses’ wage cheques are 
millions, get 53 times as much as a worker) (De Lange 2006) highlight the importance 
of the issue and have contributed to research topics in the past. Another controversial 
issue raised in the newspapers was Eskom’s management, which was awarded share 
options with a potential value of R10 million (for performance in the 2006/2007 
financial year) as part of a performance bonus scheme. This was despite power cuts 
and problems experienced with electricity provision during the period covered by 
the 2006/2007 financial statements (Noyce 2008).
The structure of executive remuneration has changed considerably over time, 
and a large volume of research has therefore been done on whether executive 
remuneration is an effective way of aligning the interests of stakeholders (in this 
article referring to shareholders, employees other than executive directors, trade 
unions and others) and executive management. There are several schools of thought 
concerning research on executive remuneration. The first school investigates 
whether share options help to align the interests of the various parties. Earlier 
research carried out by Jensen and Meckling (1976) investigated the alignment of 
interests and the alleviation of agency costs between stakeholders and executive 
management and found the agent’s remuneration package to be an effective way of 
monitoring the agent. After this research had been conducted, boards of directors 
in the USA dramatically increased share option awards to senior executives, as can 
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be seen from studies performed by Yermack (1995), Lakonishok and Lee (2001) 
and Balsam (2002). Studies conducted by Hanlon, Shevlin and Rajgopal (2003) 
presented evidence that the granting of share options is indeed linked to an increase 
in the future operating income of the firms investigated. 
Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) reiterated in a study on oil and gas companies 
that share options align the interests of risk-neutral shareholders and risk-adverse 
managers by mitigating the risk of chief executive officers (CEOs) approving risky 
exploration projects. More recently, Balsam and Miharjo (2007) noted that executive 
share options influence executive retention, decreasing the likelihood of executives 
leaving the organisation in subsequent years. 
The second school of thought examines whether share options induce 
opportunistic managerial behaviour. A detailed discussion regarding these studies is 
included in this article under the section dealing with the effect of share options on 
managerial behaviour. The aim of this article is twofold: firstly, to combine current 
international literature available on the conflicts of interests between executive 
management and various stakeholders when share options are granted as part of 
executive remuneration; and secondly, to outline safeguards and a best-practice 
framework combining local and international corporate governance principles, 
legislation and disclosure developments to help align the interests of all stakeholders. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: the research objective, value 
design and methodology are discussed, followed by an investigation into the link 
between share option awards and white-collar crime and the effect of share options 
on managerial behaviour. The article then provides some safeguards that can be 
implemented to align the interests of stakeholders. The article concludes with a 
summary of a best-practice framework, and a detailed summary can be found in 
Annexure A.
Research objective, value design and methodology
The research for this article was conducted with the objective of developing a best-
practice framework for implementation and assistance in aligning the interests of 
stakeholders and executive management when share options are granted as part of 
executive remuneration. The findings and conclusions of the research mentioned 
with regard to the effect of share options on the behaviour of executive management, 
as well as implementation measures to align the interests of stakeholders, are 
discussed. 
Literature in the field of executive remuneration was reviewed, with a specific 
focus on the effect of share options granted on managerial behaviour worldwide. 
This literature comprised a wide range of articles published in accredited journals 
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and working papers of universities, articles in popular publications, doctoral theses 
and industry frameworks and regulations. Research consolidating the effect of 
share options on managerial behaviour and subsequent provision of a best-practice 
framework could not be found.
This article contributes to the field of knowledge by combining previous literature 
relating to managerial behaviour when share options are granted and will make a 
contribution to the development of a best-practice framework of safeguards to align 
interests. It adds to the ongoing debate on executive remuneration, particularly 
share options, and the effect on aligning the objectives of stakeholders and executive 
management. 
The link between share option awards and white-collar crime
A global economic crime survey carried out by PriceWaterhouseCoopers in 2007 
indicated that white-collar crime is on the increase worldwide (PWC 2007). There 
are several reasons why people commit white-collar crime. These include the desire 
for material possessions, money, power and privilege. A study conducted by Cools 
(2005) on the 25 largest corporate frauds between 1996 and 2001 worldwide indicated 
that greed, ego and the ‘dilemma of the successful CEO’ played a role in white-
collar crimes by executives. The ‘dilemma of the successful CEO’ arises because 
he or she receives bonus and share options awards and, to remain successful, sets 
increasingly higher financial targets that are difficult to achieve. CEOs then feel 
that they have no alternative but to manipulate the financial statements to reach 
these targets. The study by Cools (2005) also indicated that by the year 2000, the 
companies that would later be accused of accounting fraud had eight times higher 
awards of share options than other companies in the control group. The value of 
the share options of the companies accused of accounting fraud amounted to $1.2 
billion compared with $150 million in the control group. 
Stephen Meager, a former federal prosecutor who investigated white-collar 
crimes in the USA, stated that a strong financial motive is the best evidence a 
prosecutor can get to promote or establish criminal intent with regard to corporate 
frauds and executives’ involvement in the fraud. He further stated that the levels of 
remuneration awarded at Enron would certainly be a powerful incentive for anyone 
to do anything (Eichenwalt 2002).
Executive remuneration was at the root of many of the corporate scandals. Enron 
paid large salaries – including performance bonuses and share options linked to 
the achievement of certain share price targets – to its executive officers before its 
collapse. It has subsequently been revealed that these targets were reached through 
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massive accounting manipulation (Eichenwalt 2002). The WorldCom scandal 
involved billions of dollars of expenses that had been misallocated under capital 
expenses to cause the share price to rise in order to increase the value of the share 
options owned by executive officers (USA Bankruptcy Court 2002). 
Eff ect of share options on managerial behaviour
The wave of corporate scandals re-focused attention on executive remuneration. 
They raised issues about the design of executive remuneration and the extent to 
which options truly align the interests of executive management and stakeholders 
(Bebchuk & Fried 2004). The scandals also raised questions about whether executive 
remuneration packages, rather than solving agency problems, are actually causing 
new conflicts of interest by creating perverse incentives for executives to pursue 
short-term strategies, manage earnings, misrepresent financial statements, make 
themselves guilty of insider trading and backdate share options – all to enhance the 
value of share options, and thereby increasing the risks of granting share options 
(Eichenwalt 2002). 
The findings are contextualised throughout this section by providing the 
background and explanations and then reviewing relevant international literature 
on the subject. 
Pursuing short-term strategies
Rappaport (2005) reports that a company’s value depends on its long-term ability to 
generate cash to fund value-creating growth and pay dividends to its shareholders. 
Research found that investment managers often base share selections on short-term 
earnings, rather than on discounted cash flow, the standard for valuing financial 
assets in capital markets. Corporate executives often point to the behaviour of 
market participants to justify their short-term focus and their belief that investment 
for the long term is not rewarded by higher share prices. 
The ability of executive officers to sell their own shares in the short term possibly 
alleviates this problem. A possible driving force for the dishonest behaviour can 
be traced to executive compensation schemes, and specifically to share options 
(Rappaport 2005). Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006) show that executive 
compensation contracts that include share options may emphasise short-term share 
performance at the expense of long-term fundamental value, which increases the 
speculative component of the share price. Bebchuk and Fried (2005) found that 
firms often base bonuses and other forms of executive compensation on earnings 
figures that can be manipulated, and commonly give managers broad freedom to 
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choose when to sell shares. Research conducted by Van Cleaf and Kelly (2005) on 60 
of the largest companies in the USA that had a negative return on capital for a five-
year period and appeared to be without a viable business model shows that these 
companies lost a total of $700 billion in market value added (MVA) and $485 billion 
in negative economic profit over five years. Nevertheless, they paid their executive 
officers approximately $9 billion to $12 billion in emoluments. 
Earnings management
Earnings management is the intentional misapplication of accounting rules and 
misreporting of financial results that causes reported income to be larger or smaller 
than it would otherwise be (Davidson, Jiraporn, Kim & Nemic 2004). The use of 
accruals to temporarily boost or reduce reported earnings is one of the mechanisms 
used for earnings management (Bergstresser & Philippon 2006). A study conducted 
by Ke (2005) reports that the probability of CEOs with equity-based compensation 
reporting a continual small increase in earnings is higher in companies with low 
book to market ratios (that is, growth shares) than in companies with high book-to-
market ratios (that is, value shares). 
Bebchuk and Fried (2005) found that the executive compensation arrangements 
of the Financial National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), a USA financial 
company, richly reward executives for reporting higher earnings without requiring 
them to return the compensation if the earnings were to be misstated. They further 
found that the structuring of both equity and non-equity compensation provides 
executives with incentives to inflate short-term earnings at the expense of long-term 
shareholder value. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) examined data to establish 
whether the increase in the use of accruals is related to the increase in share-based 
CEO compensation. They found evidence that a Compustat sample of publicly 
held companies in the USA, whose CEOs receive share options as part of executive 
compensation, has reported higher levels of earnings management. 
Zhang et al. (2008) examined data compiled from the executive compensation of 
publicly listed companies in the USA (Compustat) as well as from a USA General 
Accounting Office restatements database and report that CEOs are more likely to 
manipulate firm earnings when they own more share options than shares. 
Financial misrepresentation
Financial misrepresentation occurs when any false or misleading representation is 
made, usually with the intent to deceive or defraud. Erickson, Hanlon and Maydew 
(2006); Harris and Bromiley (2007), and Burns and Kedia (2006) found that CEOs 
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whose share option holdings make their wealth more sensitive to share-price 
changes are more likely to make financial misrepresentations. 
Burns and Kedia (2008) examined share option exercises by top executives for a 
sample of 224 large USA Standards & Poor 1 500 firms that restate their financial 
statements. They found that executives from firms restating financial statements 
exercise significantly more options than executives from firms that do not restate 
financial statements. In addition, they argued that the magnitude of the restatement 
effect on net income is positively related to the fraction of the exercisable options 
that executives actually exercise. After having studied 43 firms accused of accounting 
fraud by the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), Johnson, Ryan and Tian 
(2008) found that executives who commit fraud have a greater incentive to do so, as 
it stems from a significantly larger share and share option holding. 
Insider trading
Insider trading is the illegal buying or selling of securities on the basis of information 
that is unavailable to the public. Wei (2004) found strong evidence that top-executive 
insider parties exercise employee share options on the basis of private information. 
Agrawal and Cooper (2008) found strong evidence, more widespread than in other 
studies, that executive management sells substantially more shares during the period 
in which financial results are misstated. 
Insider trading while committing accounting fraud
Some of the companies and top executive officers involved in accounting fraud 
face lawsuits from regulators and investors. An issue in the lawsuits against these 
executives is whether they traded securities before the exposure of accounting 
problems (therefore insider trading) (Palmrose & Scholtz 2004). For example, 
Enron’s executives and directors collectively sold US$1.1 billion in Enron shares 
from 1999 to mid-2001, when management reported fraudulent accounting results 
(Wayne 2002).
During the massive accounting fraud at HealthSouth, one of the USA’s largest 
healthcare providers, the CEO at the time, Richard Scrushly, sold shares for several 
hundred million dollars (Romero & Freudenham 2003). Joseph Nacchio, the former 
CEO of Qwest Communications, a large USA communications company, sold 
over $100 million in shares during the company’s accounting fraud (Shore 2007). 
A study conducted by the Chicago Tribune on 207 USA companies that revised 
their financial statements indicates that these firms decreased revenue by US$10.6 
billion, and that US$5 billion in shares had been sold in these periods by insiders in 




Share option backdating is the process of granting share options that are dated prior 
to the actual date that the company granted those share options. In this way, the 
exercise price of the granted option can be set at a lower price than the company’s 
share price at the granting date. The purpose is to allow the person who gets the 
option grant to realise a larger gain without the company having to show it on the 
financial statements (Heron & Lie 2007). Chauvin and Shenoy (2001), Heron and 
Lie (2007) and Narayanan and Seyhun (2005) found that companies’ share returns 
are abnormally high immediately after executive share-option grants. These findings 
are interpreted as evidence that most of the abnormal return patterns around option 
grants can be attributed to the backdating of option grant dates.
Government investigators in the USA have investigated the share-option 
backdating scandal, and until August 2008, 39 cases of securities fraud action had 
been lodged against USA corporations in the backdating scandal, as well as 168 cases 
of shareholder derivative lawsuits (La Croix 2008). The CEO of Apple Computer, 
Steve Jobs, former financial officer Fred Anderson, former general council Nancy 
R. Heinen, and several members of the company’s board of directors were sued for 
securities fraud (Claburn 2008). Apple executives have since settled the lawsuit for 
$14 million (Krazit 2008). The former CEO of Brocade Communications, Gregory 
Reyes, was sentenced to 21 months in prison and fined $15 million (Pimentel 
2008) for manipulating the values of share options and then falsifying the company 
records. The former human resources chief of Brocade Communications, Stephanie 
Jensen, was sentenced to four months in prison and fined $1.25 million for her role 
in the share-option backdating scheme (Associated Press 2008). The former CEO 
of Maxim Integrated Products in the USA agreed to pay $800 000 for penalties and 
lost earnings (Pimentel 2007). 
Safeguards to be implemented
In order to help prevent the inappropriate managerial behaviour associated with 
the granting of share options from occurring, as already discussed, changes should 
be implemented at an internal governance level, as well as in the manner in which 
directors are remunerated and the way in which this remuneration is disclosed. A 
summary listing the safeguards, including best practices locally and internationally, 
is presented in the following section. The detailed table of safeguards is included 
in Annexure A. The secret is to implement safeguards to ensure that executive 
management has enough of its own financial future at risk to act like shareholders 
(Monks & Minow 2004).
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Internal governance structures
Internal governance procedures are established to maintain the credibility of the 
firm’s financial statements and corporate safeguards against the behaviour identified 
in the section referring to the effect of share options on managerial behaviour. The 
internal governance structures discussed in the following subsections could be 
improved to help align the interests of stakeholders and executive management. 
Independent non-executive directors
The King II Report and the draft King III report require companies to appoint 
a balance of executive and non-executive directors, preferably a majority of non-
executive directors to be independent of management so that minority interests can 
be protected. Independence is defined in the King II Report as being free from any 
business or other relationship that could be seen to materially interfere with the 
individual’s capacity (IoD 2002, 2009). 
Independent directors are relied upon to monitor, supervise and set executives’ 
compensation and can play a key role in monitoring effective corporate governance 
structures (Bebchuk 2007). The need for independent directors arose because of the 
potential divergence of interests between stakeholders and executive management 
(Han 2003). The role of the independent non-executive director has come under 
intense scrutiny in the wake of the corporate collapses, resulting in an enquiry in the 
UK by Derek Higgs (2003) (who chaired the Higgs Committee) into the role and 
effectiveness of non-executive directors. Higgs reported that the personal attributes 
required of the effective non-executive director should be integrity and high ethical 
standards, sound judgement, the ability and willingness to challenge and probe, and 
strong interpersonal skills. Other recommendations made include (Higgs 2003):
• Guidance by the code of corporate governance on pre-appointment due diligence 
conducted by non-executive directors to satisfy themselves that they have the 
knowledge, skills, experience and time to make a positive contribution to the 
board 
• The appointment of a senior independent non-executive director with direct 
access to and from shareholders
• Recommendations on extending directors’ and officers’ indemnity insurance to 
potential non-executive directors before they are appointed
• Recommendations on permitting directors’ indemnity insurance without the 
limits of a ‘reasonable prospect of success test’. This is a test to indicate whether 
a proposed action, application, defence or response is likely to succeed; it is 
required to ensure more responsibility on the part of the directors. 
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The draft King III Report on corporate governance gives a definition of an 
independent non-executive director. The Report strengthened the evaluation 
of independence by recommending that the check for independence should be 
performed annually. King stated that in drafting the final King III report, attention 
would be paid to listing the factors to consider when determining independence 
as well as clarifying the issue of independence to a greater extent (PKF Chartered 
Accountants 2009; IoD 2009).
Shareholder involvement in the selection of directors
The King II Report states that procedures for the appointment of directors to the 
board should be formal and transparent and that such procedures should be dealt 
with by the board as a whole, assisted where appropriate by a nomination committee. 
This committee should comprise only non-executive directors, the majority of whom 
should be independent, and should be chaired by the board chairperson (IoD 2002). 
The draft King III Report states that the appointment of directors is the 
responsibility of the shareholders. The Board as a whole would appoint directors, 
assisted by the nomination committee, after the background of the potential director 
had been verified (IoD 2009).
The CEO often influences the selection and retention of directors, and the lack 
of shareholder involvement makes director independence difficult (Gordon 2005). 
Under the current process, shareholders only vote on director candidates nominated 
by the directors (or nomination committee). To address this, an important governance 
tool was implemented in the UK and proposed by the Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in the USA. This governance tool proposes that shareholders 
should have the right to nominate director candidates and that the nomination and 
election process should function as a means of ensuring board accountability (SEC 
2006; ICGN 2006). 
Board and committee responsibilities
The board of directors is one of the most important governance mechanisms for 
ensuring that managers pursue the interests of stakeholders. Its task is to monitor, 
discipline and remove ineffective management teams (Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid & 
Zimmermann 2004). The King II and draft King III Reports make some strong 
recommendations on the board’s responsibilities, structure and composition (IoD 
2002, 2009). Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008), Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) and 
Raheja (2005) argue that a smaller board is more effective in monitoring the actions 
of the CEO than a bigger board, which has greater emphasis on politeness and 
courtesy and is therefore easier for a CEO to control.
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Audit committees
The King II Report recommends that an audit committee be appointed, which gives 
the board of directors a means of monitoring an effective internal control system. 
In addition, the audit committee must reinforce both the internal control system 
and the internal audit function (IoD 2002). The board often relies on the audit 
committee to identify and question any unusual business practices, aggressive 
accounting methods and violations of the company’s code of business conduct as 
protectors of investors’ interests (Brown 1999). Section 269A of the Companies Act 
of South Africa (Act No. 61 of 1973) requires widely held companies to appoint an 
audit committee. In terms of the Companies Act and the Companies Bill (issued on 
30 May 2008), the membership of the audit committee should consist of independent 
non-executive directors.
The draft King III Report proposes the use of a combined assurance model, 
whereby significant risks are identified and suitably managed by the internal 
assurance providers ( for example, internal audit), external assurance providers (for 
example, external audit) and management. Shareholders should appoint the audit 
committee. The audit committee should be responsible for the appointment of the 
external auditors that provide external audit services and other services (IoD 2009).
To ensure a truly independent audit committee, the following should be allowed 
(Brown 1999): The audit committee should be able to:
• Retain outside legal counsel without approval from management
• Consult an independent auditing firm when a second opinion is required 
• Access all books, records and employees of the organisation
• Exercise the power to conduct any investigation appropriate to fulfilling its 
responsibilities.
In the wake of the wave of corporate scandals, the audit committee needs to 
fulfil a more proactive oversight role. Audit committees need to ensure greater 
accountability on the part of management and internal and external auditors. Audit 
committees must also: ensure that all parties involved in the financial reporting 
process and the process of internal controls understand their roles; gain input 
from internal and external auditors as well as outside experts when necessary; 
and safeguard the overall objectivity of the financial reporting and internal control 
processes. In terms of the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (also known as the 
Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act), the relationship 
between management and external auditors is largely replaced by one between the 
audit committee and external auditors to ensure objectivity. The audit committee 
is now responsible for the appointment, compensation, retention and oversight 
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of the external auditors, who report directly to the audit committee. All audit 
services and permitted non-audit services provided by the external auditors must 
be pre-approved by the audit committee and disclosed in the company’s financial 
statements, as required by section 204 of the amended Sarbanes Oxley Act (Brodsky, 
Grochowski, Baker & Huber 2003).
Remuneration committee
The King II Report recommends that the remuneration committee should approve 
a share option scheme, as well as setting the rules applicable to such a scheme and 
approving any amendments. Remuneration for each director should be determined 
after consultation with the CEO. The remuneration committee should be made up 
of independent non-executive directors (IoD 2002). 
The Greenbury Report on directors’ remuneration recommends that the 
membership of the remuneration committee should be determined so that no cross-
directorships between members and executive directors exist that could result in 
influencing one another’s remuneration (Greenbury 1995). The members of the 
remuneration committee should have a sound knowledge of the company and its 
executive directors, a keen interest in its progress and a full understanding of the 
shareholders’ concerns. The remuneration committee should be responsible for all 
aspects of the remuneration programme and have the necessary resources available 
to fulfil its duties. All relevant information should be taken into account when 
the remuneration programme is established, including peer analysis and market 
examples, but it should not be over-emphasised and should support the objectives 
of the company (ICGN 2006).
Institutional ownership
Institutional investors have both a fiduciary responsibility for and an economic 
interest in ensuring that executive remuneration is well aligned with the interests 
of stakeholders (ICGN 2006). Studies by Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003), Hartzell 
and Starks (2003), and Burns, Kedia and Lipson (2006) have found evidence that 
corporate monitoring by institutional investors (mutual funds, banks and insurance 
companies) can constrain managers’ behaviour. Large institutional investors 
have the opportunity, resources and ability to monitor, discipline and influence 
managers, which forces managers to focus more on corporate performance and 
less on opportunistic or self-serving behaviour. Monitoring might reduce the use 
of discretional accruals (Cornett, Marcus, Saunders & Tehranian 2007). Khan, 
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Dharwadkar and Brandes (2005) studied 224 USA companies with institutional 
ownership and reported that when a company has a large element of institutional 
ownership, lower levels of executive compensation are found and lower ratios of 
share options are awarded to executives. 
The stance of the King II Report with respect to the role of institutional investors 
was to point out possible insider-trading problems. This suggests that institutions 
may be reluctant to cooperate with one another. This may reflect unwillingness 
on their part to assume a powerful role in South African corporate life. The idea 
behind institutional involvement is not to become controlling shareholders, but 
rather to monitor and assess the company and to enforce good governance within 
the mechanisms that shareholders have at their disposal (Malherbe & Segal 2001).
Changes in remuneration
The King II Report recommends that the levels of remuneration should be sufficient 
to attract, retain and motivate executives of the required quality, and that a substantial 
element of the remuneration package should be performance based (IoD 2002). 
The draft King III report recommends that the remuneration committee should 
ensure an appropriate mix between fixed and variable pay, according to value added 
by the individual, and should be periodically assessed. Incentive awards linked to 
the share price should not be awarded to the chairman or non-executive directors 
(IoD 2009). Gordon (2005) notes that various compensation terms appear to be 
poorly designed in linking remuneration with the performance of the company. To 
rectify this, the remuneration plan should be structured with short-term as well as 
long-term incentives and linked to the company’s performance, which reflects the 
value to stakeholders (ICGN 2006).
The short-term incentives should be tied to annual performance measures. 
Objectives should be set and recorded at the beginning of the performance period. 
The long-term incentive tools should consist of an appropriate mix of equity and 
equity-like incentive structures, including share options, restricted shares and share 
appreciation rights (ICGN 2006).
Changes to share options
Chesney and Gibson-Asner (2006) report that an effective way of using share options 
as part of executive remuneration is not to set the maturity date of the share options. 
They conclude that, when the maturity date of the share options is not predictable 
and when the justice process is very efficient (entailing prosecution if caught out), 
it was found that managers remain honest.
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An alternative security measure that can be put in place when share options are 
issued is to include in the remuneration package long calls written on the firm’s 
shares and short perpetual put options activated when a manager is convicted of 
illicit activities. These put options represent an honesty discount. Share options 
have benefits such as inducing directors to take on more risky projects and from that 
perspective can benefit the shareholders who fear directors’ excessive cautiousness. 
The respected benefits received from granting share options have to be traded off 
against the higher risk of fraud to reach the optimal remuneration package for 
directors (Chesney & Gibson-Asner 2006). 
Another measure that could be implemented is that management should be 
obliged to hold vested shares for a period of three years. Under current arrangements, 
managers often sell options as soon as they vest. This could create an undesirable 
incentive for short-term management at the expense of long-term shareholder value 
(Palley 2007). The King II Report recommends a vesting period of three years for 
share options awarded to non-executive directors. Shareholders must recommend 
the granting of share options to non-executive directors. If re-pricing of shares is 
proposed, this must be approved by shareholders. If share options are to be offered 
at a discount to the ruling price, shareholders should vote on this separately (IoD 
2002). 
Another measure to implement, as recommended by Rappaport (2005), is 
discounted indexed share options with extended time horizons. These indexed share 
options should have an exercise price linked to an index price of the company’s 
competitors. Indexed options do not reward underperforming executives and are 
worth exercising only when the company’s shares outperform the index price. If 
the index price declines, the exercise price also declines, which keeps executives 
motivated. 
Approval of compensation plans
Executive compensation should be submitted to shareholders for approval and be 
disclosed with metrics of relative performances such as return on equity (Palley 
2007). The King II Report recommends that the approval of the share or any other 
incentive scheme, rules and amendments made by the remuneration committee 
should be submitted to shareholders if applicable (IoD 2002). The draft King III 
Report recommends that the shareholders should approve the remuneration policy 
(IoD 2009).
The vote cast by the shareholders of GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) in the UK is what 
newspapers called ‘setting the tone for future shareholder activism’. In May 2003, 
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50.2% of the shareholders voted against approving the group’s remuneration report. 
Investors reacted angrily to a controversial ‘golden parachute’ for the then CEO, 
Jean-Pierre Garnier. Roger Lyons, the general secretary of the manufacturing union 
Amicus, told BBC News 24 that corporate greed would never be the same again, 
and this vote would have far-reaching implications for other big companies (BBC 
2003). Another proposal is that the remuneration packages should be approved by 
shareholders beforehand, rather than relying on the facility to express dissatisfaction 
afterwards (ICAEW 2008). 
Improving transparency and disclosure
Mervyn King, the chairman of the King Committee on Corporate Governance 
(which issued the King Reports on Corporate Governance), identified seven primary 
characteristics (or pillars) of good governance against which all corporate decisions 
should be checked, and transparency is one of these pillars (IoD 2002). The King 
II Report requires companies to have a formal and transparent remuneration policy 
and to publish the remuneration philosophy in the annual financial report (IoD 
2002). Requirements to disclose remuneration in annual financial reports could 
be seen as a constructive opportunity to communicate with stakeholders. Greater 
transparency regarding the amount of executives’ earnings or possible earnings 
should exist (PWC 2007). This disclosure should include providing the rationale 
for the remuneration programme design and indicating how the components of 
the programme are integrated into an overall remuneration philosophy. Companies 
should provide a full explanation of the relationship of the programme to individual 
performance measures, and should include specific performance targets (ICGN 
2006). 
The draft King III Report propose that remuneration policies should be approved 
by the shareholders and that an annual remuneration report should be issued (IoD 
2009).
Management often hides information from stakeholders through difficult or 
incomplete disclosure (Gordon 2005). In the USA, companies are required to 
disclose directors’ remuneration in understandable English (SEC 2006). In order 
to provide stakeholders with a better understanding, the disclosure requirements 
with regard to directors’ remuneration (specifically with regard to share options) 
were amended in the UK and contain an additional remuneration report that must 
be audited, and on which shareholders must vote. The report should contain a 
performance graph that must include the total shareholder return for the past five 
years, the performance parameters that were used to determine the share-option 
awards (as well as any deviation from the parameters), and detailed information on 
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the market price of share options exercised and unexercised (ICGN 2006). These 
measures are more comprehensive than in South Africa, with a greater emphasis on 
performance-related salaries. 
In Australia, the Corporate Law and Economic Reform Act of 2004 includes 
a requirement that listed public companies disclose directors’ remuneration in a 
dedicated section of the directors’ report. Specific disclosure requirements are 
extended by including directors’ remuneration disclosure of the top five executives 
in the whole group, and this requires detailed and explicit information concerning 
the link between remuneration and corporate performance (Hill 2006). 
In the USA, there has been an initially muted response to the requirements for 
disclosure of executive remuneration, but in January 2006, the SEC announced 
that it proposed to extensively review the executive remuneration disclosure rules. 
The implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 shortened the time for the 
reporting of share-option grants to two business days. This greatly diminished the 
problem of share-option backdating (Heron & Lie 2007).
In South Africa, listing requirements of the JSE Securities Exchange (JSE) 
require that all companies listed on the JSE should disclose an aggregate of each 
director’s remuneration, including fees, basic salary, bonuses and performance-
related payments, allowances, contributions to the pension scheme, share options 
(including the strike price, period and other relevant information), fees paid to 
third parties, and directors’ votes on proposals in which they have material interests. 
It also requires an opening balance with regard to share options outstanding, as 
well as movement throughout the year (with respect to share options taken up and 
issued). The price at which the shares were taken up must be indicated (JSE 2003).
For companies that need to comply with international financial reporting 
standards (IFRS), IFRS 2 on share-based payments requires that for share options 
and other equity instruments awarded during the period covered by the financial 
statements, the number and weighted average fair value of these instruments, as 
well as information on how fair value is measured, should be disclosed. For share 
options modified during the period, an explanation should be provided as well as 
the incremental fair value of the modifications and how the fair value was measured. 
Information should be disclosed to enable the users of the financial statements to 
understand the effect of share-based payment transactions on the entity’s profit or 
loss and financial position (IASB 2007). 
The King II Report and the draft King III Report recommend a breakdown 
of directors’ remuneration into individual components (IoD 2002, 2009. The 
Companies Act disclosure requirements require that executive and non-executive 
remuneration be disclosed separately and that the profit in relation to the exercising 
of share options also be disclosed. 
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Table 1: Summary of safeguards to be implemented where share options are 
granted as part of executive remuneration in order to align the interests of 
stakeholders and executive management
Directors
• The requirements and appointment process of directors should be clearly defi ned, 
including independent non-executive directors; the roles and structure of the 
various directors forming the management team and related committees should 
also be clearly defi ned.
• The insurance cover of directors should be amended and extended.
Board and committee responsibilities
• The board structure should be streamlined and its eff ectiveness reviewed and 
evaluated regularly. 
 Audit committee
• The requirements of the members of the committee should be clearly defi ned.
• Processes should be implemented to allow members to gain full access to all the 
resources required.
• The audit committee should take full responsibility for the external auditors.
• The audit committee should ensure greater accountability on the part of 
management as well as the internal and external audits.
Remuneration committee
• The requirements and skills required of the members should be clearly defi ned 
before forming a committee. 
• The committee should be responsible for all aspects of the remuneration 
programme and integrate all components of remuneration.
• The members should have a sound knowledge of the company and its process and 
key business drivers, taking into account all stakeholder interests. 
Institutional ownership
• Institutional investors should be more involved to ensure corporate monitoring 
and good governance.
Salaries
• Remuneration should include both short-term and long-term incentives, while 
giving suffi  cient consideration to the terms of the incentive by linking each term 
to an outcome.
Approval of compensation plans
• Shareholders should approve the compensation plans and in doing so, the 
shareholders should be fully informed of the compensation plan. 
Transparency and disclosure
• There should be full disclosure per director, including a non-technical explanation 
of the rationale for the remuneration plan.
• The disclosure per type of remuneration should be extended to include the 
full terms and current status of the fi nancial instruments (if applicable). Where 
changes occur in the information related to the fi nancial instrument as previously 
disclosed, these should be presented.
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The new Companies Bill, which will replace the current Companies Act in 
South Africa, requires the number and class of any securities issued to a director or 
any person relating to them, as well as the consideration received by the company 
for those securities, to be disclosed. 
Best-practice framework
Table 1 can be used as a checklist to ensure that, where share options are granted as 
part of executive remuneration, they indeed align the interests of stakeholders and 
executive management. It summarises the safeguards that have been discussed and 
can be used as a best-practice framework.
Conclusion
This article was conducted with the objective of developing a best-practice framework 
to align the interests of stakeholders with executive management. Managerial 
behaviour that took place internationally when share options were granted as part of 
executive remuneration was investigated and safeguards identified to help prevent 
dishonest behaviour. 
The important question with regard to executive remuneration is not how much 
it should be, but how to structure the remuneration (including share options) to 
align the interests of stakeholders and executive management. The answer can be 
found in the best-practice safeguards listed in Table 1, which contains a balance 
between corporate structuring, disclosure and shareholder participation. 
The aim of the executive directors of the company should be to manage the 
business affairs of the company towards enhancing business prosperity and corporate 
accountability in order to realise long-term shareholder value, while taking into 
account the interests of the other stakeholders. Share options as part of executive 
remuneration should be well managed to enable executive management to create 
long-term shareholder value. 
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Annexure
Annexure Table 1: Detailed list of safeguards to be implemented
Detailed list of safeguards to be implemented Source
Directors
• There should be a distinction between the chairperson 
and CEO. Where this is not possible, an independent 
non-executive director should serve as deputy 
chairman, or there should be a strong non-executive 
element on the board. 
King II Report (IoD 2002)
Draft King III Report (IoD 
2009)
• The majority of the directors on the board should be 
non-executive directors. 
King II Report (IoD 2002)
Draft King III Report (IoD 
2009)
• Non-executive directors should be competent, 
experienced and independent.
Higgs Committee (Higgs 
2003)
Brown (1999)





• The nomination committee should assist with the 
appointment of directors. The process should be 
formal and transparent. 
Higgs Committee (Higgs 
2003)
• Shareholders should be involved in the nomination of 
directors for the selection process.
• Guidance in corporate governance codes should be 
given on the pre-appointment due diligence carried 
out by non-executive directors with respect to their 
abilities to contribute to the board.
• A senior independent non-executive director should 
be appointed and should have direct access to and 
from shareholders.
• Extending directors’ and offi  cers’ indemnity insurance 
to potential non-executive directors before they are 
appointed is recommended.
• Permitting directors’ indemnity insurance without 
the limits of a ‘reasonable prospect of success’ test 
is recommended to ensure more responsibility on the 
part of the director. 
• Non-executive directors should have integrity with 
high ethical values, sound judgement, the ability 





Annexure Table 1 (continued)
Detailed list of safeguards to be implemented Source
Board and committee responsibilities
• A corporate structure should be implemented to lend 
directional responsibility to the core function, thus 
limiting the board size. 
King II Report (IoD 2002)
Draft King III Report (IoD 
2009)
Hermalin & Weisbach 
(2003)
Raheja (2005)
• The nomination committee should regularly review 
and assess the board to ensure its eff ectiveness.
King II Report (IoD 2002)
Draft King III Report (IoD 
2009)
Audit committee
• The audit committee should consist mainly of 
independent non-executive directors who are 
fi nancially literate. 
King II Report (IoD 2002)
Draft King III Report (IoD 
2009)
• This committee should, without prior consent of the 
company, be able to:
o Have access to outside legal council
o Find an independent audit fi rm for a second 
opinion
o Have ready access to all books, records and 
employees
o Have the power to conduct any investigation.
Brown (1999)
• This committee should ensure greater accountability 
on the part of management as well as the internal and 
external audits. 
US Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC 2006)
Draft King III Report (IoD 
2009)• The audit committee is responsible for the 
appointment, compensation, retention and oversight 
of the external auditors.
Remuneration committee
• This committee should consist mainly of independent 
non-executive directors.
King II Report (IoD 2002)
Draft King III Report (IoD 
2009)
• The committee should be responsible for all aspects 




(ICGN 2006)• The committee should take into account all relevant 
information in establishing the programme.
(continued)
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Annexure Table 1 (continued)
Detailed list of safeguards to be implemented Source
• The members of this committee should have a sound 
knowledge of the company and its executive directors, 
a keen interest in its progress and a full understanding 
of stakeholders’ concerns. Greenbury Report 
(Greenbury 1995)
• The membership of the remuneration committee 
should be determined so that no cross-directorships 
between members and executive directors exist.
Institutional ownership
• Institutional investors should be more involved to 





• Salaries should consist of cash and short-term 




• For share options granted, the maturity date should 
not be set beforehand, but linked to performance; 
strong internal controls should be implemented. 
Chesney & Gibson-Asner 
(2006)
• Share options should consist of vested shares. Palley (2007)
• Discounted indexed share options should be 
implemented with extended time horizons indexed to 
an index price of the company’s competitors.
Rappaport (2005)
Approval of compensation plans
• Shareholders should approve the compensation plans 
of executives.
Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England 
and Wales (ICAEW 2008)
Draft King III Report (IoD 
2009)
• If dilution of shares occurs with the granting of share 





• If share options are issued at a discount to the ruling 
price, shareholders should cast a separate vote.
King II Report (IoD 2002)
• No backdating of share option awards should be 
allowed.
Draft King III Report (IoD 
2009)
Disclosure
• Full disclosure by directors on an individual basis must 
be made for all share and incentive schemes. 
King II Report (IoD 2002)





Annexure Table 1 (continued)
Detailed list of safeguards to be implemented Source
• Full and complete disclosure regarding the 
compensation and the rationale for the remuneration 




Draft King III Report (IoD 
2009)
• An explanation of the diff erences between the 





• The information should be reported in uncomplicated 
English to make it more understandable. 
US Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC 2006)
• The disclosure of executive remuneration should be 





• Granting of share options should be reported to a 
regulatory body within two days of the granting of 
these options.
US Security and 
Exchange Commission 
(SEC 2006)
• The remuneration should be disclosed in two 
categories, namely executive and non-executive 
directors.
US Security and 
Exchange Commission 
(SEC 2006)
• Directors’ emoluments include gains made when 
exercising share options. 
S 297 (Companies Act 
No. 61 of 1973, South 
Africa)
• Share-option payments should be disclosed per 
director indicating: 
o Opening balance including the number and strike 
price
o The number and strike prices awarded during the 
year
o The strike dates of lots of options awarded
o The number options exercised and at what price
o The closing balance of share options, including 
the number of share options at each diff erent 
strike price.
S 297 (Companies Act 
No. 61 of 1973, South 
Africa)
JSE (JSE 2003)
• Only the remuneration of the holding company’s 
directors should be included in consolidated fi nancial 
statements; payments that these directors receive 
from the subsidiaries in directors’ emoluments should 
also be indicated.
4th Schedule 
(Companies Act No. 61 
of 1973, South Africa)
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Annexure Table 1 (continued)
Detailed list of safeguards to be implemented Source
• For options awarded during the period covered by 
the fi nancial statements, the weighted average fair 
value of the share options on the grant date should 
be provided, as well as information on how the fair 
value is measured, including:
o the option pricing model used and the input 
elements to the model;
o the historical volatility and an explanation of the 
diff erences between the historical and expected 
volatility, or an explanation as to how the 
expected volatility was set, if not set on historical 
volatility; and
o if and how other elements were considered in the 
measurement of fair value. 
International Financial 
Reporting Standards 
(IFRS 2) (IASB 2007)
• For other equity instruments granted during the 
period, the number and weighted average fair value 
of those equity instruments at measurement date 
should be provided, as well as information on how 
the fair value was measured, including:
o if the fair value was not measured on the basis of 
observable market price, how it was determined;
o whether and how the expected dividends were 
incorporated into the measurement of fair value; 
and
o whether and how other features of the equity 
instruments granted were incorporated into the 
measurement of fair value.
• For share-based payments modifi ed during the 
period:
o an explanation of the modifi cations;
o the incremental fair value granted (as a result of 
those modifi cations); and
o information on how the incremental fair value 
granted was measured consistently with the 
requirements already set out, where applicable.
• The entity shall disclose information that will enable 
the users of the fi nancial statements to understand 
the eff ect of share-based payment transactions on 
the entity’s profi t or loss for the period and on its 




Annexure Table 1 (continued
Detailed list of safeguards to be implemented Source
• An entity should disclose at least the following:
 o  the total expense recognised for the period 
arising from share-based payment transactions 
in which the goods or services received did not 
qualify for recognition as assets and hence were 
recognised immediately as an expense arising 
from transactions accounted for as equity, in 
other words, settled share-based payment 
transactions; and
 o  for liabilities arising from share-based payment 
transactions:
     ■  the total carrying amount at the end of the 
period;
        ■  the total intrinsic value at the end of the period 
for liabilities for which the counterparty’s right 
to cash or other assets had vested by the end 
of the period (for example, vested appreciation 
rights).
 o  the number and class of any securities issued 
to a director or any person related to a director, 
as well as the consideration received by the 
company for those securities.
S 6 (Companies Bill, 
South Africa)
